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I am delighted to be part of this symposium on labor in the “age of Obama,” and 
I am especially pleased to discuss the public sector. For too long, scholars have 
viewed public-sector labor relations as something of a boutique or specialty 
subject. The many recent books and articles that describe (and generally decry) the 
state of private-sector labor law and labor relations hardly mention the public 
sector.
1
 Yet public-sector unions are one of the labor movement’s biggest success 
stories. For some time, the union density rate in the public sector has been around 
40%, while the private-sector rate is now less than 7%.
2
 Indeed, as of 2010, in the 
United States more government employees were union members than private-sector 
employees.
3
 In short, “the public sector” is over half of “labor” in the age of 
Obama, and public-sector unions have achieved many of labor’s most significant 
accomplishments in the past few decades. Scholars should take heed. 
On the other hand, public-sector unions are now facing extraordinary 
difficulties. In the initial draft of this Article, before the November 2010 elections, I 
played with the “best of times, worst of times” cliché. By early 2011 it became 
clear that public-sector unions are under attacks unprecedented in modern times. 
Since public-sector unions did not even begin to win the right to bargain 
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collectively until the 1960s, this may not be literally the worst of times for them,
4
 
but right now the balance seems closer to “worst” than “best.” The economic crisis 
has caused significant cuts in public employment. By the fall of 2010, the number 
of workers employed by local governments had dropped to its lowest level since 
October 2006, and the drop in local government employment from August to 
September 2010 was the biggest one-month decline since 1982.
5
 These trends are 
projected to continue or even worsen through 2011.
6
 More broadly, the recession 
has provided an opportunity for some not only to argue that public workers are 
overcompensated, but also to blame various economic and budget woes on public 
sector unions and their right to bargain collectively.  
Of course, describing “public-sector labor” in this or any other era is a 
challenge. Public employment includes a wide variety of jobs and types of 
employers: police officers in Virginia, grade school teachers in Missouri, security 
screeners for the Transportation Safety Administration, municipal janitors in 
California, and white-collar professionals in Ohio state agencies. Also, 
public-sector labor law is generally set by state and local laws, which vary 
significantly. Some states do not grant public workers the right to bargain 
collectively at all; some allow only a few types of public workers to bargain 
collectively; others allow collective bargaining generally but do not allow strikes; 
and some allow bargaining and strikes (for most public workers).
7
 Thus, public 
school teachers in Virginia cannot bargain collectively or strike;
8
 teachers in 
Michigan can bargain collectively but cannot legally strike;
9
 and teachers in 
Pennsylvania can both bargain collectively and strike.
10
 Statutes that allow 
bargaining but not strikes (the most common approach)
11
 use varying processes for 
resolving bargaining impasses, including fact finding and mediation, and usually, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 4. For a discussion of the era before public workers began to win the right to bargain 
collectively, see generally JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE 
UNIONS, THE LAW, AND THE STATE, 1900–1962 (2004). 
 5. “Local governments employed 14.2 million, or 76,000 fewer people [in September] 
than in August, the biggest one-month decline since July 1982 . . . . Of the jobs cut, 50,000 
were in education.” Simone Baribeau & Ashley Lutz, Local Government Employment in 
U.S. Falls to Lowest Since 2006, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 8, 2010), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-08/local-government-employment-in-u-s-falls-to-
lowest-since-2006.html. 
 6. “‘Unfortunately, the government sector is likely to see heavy job cuts again in 
2011 . . . ,’ [said John Challenger, the chief executive officer of an outplacement firm that 
has studied the issue]. ‘In fact, the sector could see an increase in job cuts in 2011 . . . .’” 
Reductions-in-Force: Despite Drop, More Government Job Cuts Ahead, 49 Gov’t Empl. 
Rel. Rep. (BNA) 39 (Jan. 11, 2011). 
 7. See RICHARD C. KEARNEY WITH DAVID G. CARNEVALE, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE 
PUBLIC SECTOR 60–61, 236–37 (3d ed. 2001). 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See id.  
 11. See generally MARTIN H. MALIN, ANN C. HODGES & JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC 
SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2011) (sections discussing strikes and 
other aspects of collective bargaining); KEARNEY WITH CARNEVALE, supra note 7, at 236–37, 
264–65. 
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but not always, end in some form of binding “interest arbitration.”12 Other legal 
rules vary significantly across jurisdictions, notably on scope of bargaining (often 




Partly because they are subject to local laws, and partly because their employers 
are elected officials, public-sector unions are often very vulnerable to shifting 
political winds. While the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) seems almost 
immune to amendment,
14
 public-sector unions frequently win and lose rights 
through legislative and executive actions.
15 
The fundamental question of whether 
some, or even any, public employees should even have a right to bargain 
collectively remains contested, even though the vast majority of states have 
adopted collective bargaining rights for some or most public workers.
16
 The 
economic crisis that began in 2008 has significantly intensified these debates. 
Events are unfolding at a rapid pace. From the fall of 2010, when I first presented 
this Article, to the spring of 2011, a number of states have made significant 
changes in their public-sector laws, some of which have been quite radical.
17
 
This Article will focus on four issues involving public-sector labor in the age of 
Obama—issues that are significant on their own and also relate to questions of the 
proper nature and extent of collective bargaining in the public sector. The first two 
issues have had broad impact across the country; the second two focus on legal 
issues for discrete sets of workers that also raise broad issues about all public-sector 
labor relations.  
Part I discusses the political attacks on public-sector unions, which have 
escalated during the economic crisis and resulted in the consideration and passage 
of new laws. It describes these laws and focuses on debates over public employee 
compensation, both pay and pensions. Part II covers certain bargaining and legal 
issues created by the economic crisis: the impact on interest arbitrations, the use of 
furloughs by public employers, and cases challenging unilateral employer actions 
under the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Part III concerns acts (or 
potential acts) by the federal government that could have both great practical and 
symbolic significance: first, the continuing battle over whether employees of the 
Transportation Safety Administration (TSA) should have collective bargaining 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. See KEARNEY WITH CARNEVAL, supra note 7, at 264–65. 
 13. MALIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 457–554 (scope of bargaining); id. at 359–412 
(coverage of employees); KEARNEY WITH CARNEVAL, supra note 7. 
 14. In the first half of the Obama administration, a democratic president with a Congress 
featuring significant democratic majorities in the House and Senate was unable to pass the 
Employee Free Choice Act, which would have amended the NLRA. H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. 
(2009). The last major amendment to the NLRA, the Landrum-Griffin Act, was enacted over 
fifty years ago. See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 
86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401–531 (2006)). 
 15. See infra Part I.D. 
 16. For example, in the past decade, Indiana, Arizona, and Kentucky had governors 
issue executive orders permitting certain public employees to bargain collectively, only to 
have the next governor repeal this order. MALIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 288–89; see also 
infra Part III (for a discussion regarding federal employees). 
 17. See infra Part I.D. 
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rights, and second, a proposed statute that would grant all police and firefighters 
collective bargaining rights. Finally, Part IV will describe a set of cases from 
Missouri interpreting its state constitutional requirement that employees have “the 
right to bargain collectively,” which focus on the basic question of what exactly 
“collective bargaining” means. 
I. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, POLITICAL ATTACKS ON PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS, AND 
NEW LAWS 
A. Of Pensions and Politics 
In the best of times, the fortunes of public workers and their unions are subject 
to political shifts. Sympathetic public officials can expand their legal rights; 
unsympathetic officials can contract them. Public sympathy can put pressure on 
elected officials (including the employers of union members) in a variety of 
contexts, including contract negotiations, where collective bargaining is allowed, 
and less formal arrangements, where it is not. Similarly, public skepticism of 
government employees and their unions can hurt labor in negotiations, increase 
pressure to cut taxes and privatize public services, and affect compensation and 
other issues not subject to collective negotiation (for example, state-run pension 
plans). 
These are not the best of times. The severity of the economic downturn that 
began in the summer of 2008 needs no detailed recounting here. The current 
recession has prompted a political maelstrom around public employees and their 
unions. Critics have claimed that these workers are overcompensated and that their 
pension plans are economically unsustainable.
18
 With unemployment high, the 
relatively greater job security of public workers—real and/or perceived—is likely 
also a source of friction. 
Thus, for example, a Wall Street Journal editorial last spring made the 
remarkable claim that “America’s most privileged class are public union 
workers.”19 The New Republic titled an article “Why Public Employees Are the 
New Welfare Queens.”20 A Politico article explained: 
Spurred by state budget crunches and an angry public mood, 
Republican and some Democratic leaders are focusing with increasing 
intensity on public workers and the unions that represent them, casting 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. Amy Traub, Dir. of Research, Drum Major Inst. for Pub. Policy, Address at the 
AFL-CIO’s Annual State Legislative Issues Conference: Countering Anti-Public Worker 
Sentiment (July 24, 2010), available at http://www.drummajorinstitute.org/library/article. 
php?ID=7523 (describing and criticizing the attacks). 
 19. Editorial, The Government Pay Boom, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2010, at A18 
(emphasis omitted). One might wonder if the authors of this editorial, associated as they are 
with Wall Street, might actually be aware of a class of Americans even more privileged than, 
say, the (unionized) janitorial staff at my (public) university. 
 20. Jonathan Cohn, Why Public Employees Are the New Welfare Queens, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC, Aug. 8, 2010, http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-cohn/76884/why-your-fireman-
has-better-pension-you. 
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them as overpaid obstacles to good government and demanding cuts in 
their often-generous benefits. . . . 
 “We have a new privileged class in America,” said Indiana Gov. 
Mitch Daniels, who rescinded state workers’ collective bargaining 
power on his first day in office in 2006. “We used to think of 
government workers as underpaid public servants. Now they are better 
paid than the people who pay their salaries.”21 
Tim Pawlenty, governor of Minnesota, made the politics of the issue explicit: “If 
you inform the public and workers in the private sector about the inflated benefits 
and compensation packages of public employees, and then you remind the 
taxpayers that they’re footing the bill for that—they get on the reform train pretty 
quickly.”22 Mort Zuckerman, editor of U.S. News & World Report, was even more 
direct when he stated that we must escape from “public sector unions’ stranglehold 
on state and local governments . . . or it will crush us.”23 Paul Gigot of the Wall 
Street Journal posited “a showdown looming across the country between taxpayers 
and public employee unions over pay and pensions.”24 Taking what in other times 
might have been considered a politically risky or at least an ironic stance, former 
Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney asked, “Why should taxpayers pay for health 
care for public employees that we don’t have ourselves?”25 The November 2010 
election results, along with an economy that is still struggling, have intensified the 
mood. In the same week, my local paper reported that incoming Ohio governor 
John Kasich “wants to do away with binding arbitration for police and fire 
unions . . . and, as much as possible, dismantle the state’s 1983 collective 
bargaining law” for public employees,26 and the New York Times featured an article 
titled “Strained States Turning to Laws to Curb Unions.”27 On February 9, 2011, a 
bill was introduced in the Ohio Senate that would have, among other things: 
eliminated or severely limited collective bargaining for state workers; made all 
public-sector strikes illegal; greatly weakened binding interest arbitration rules for 
police and firefighters (who cannot currently strike); and removed, or mostly 
removed, health insurance from the scope of mandatory bargaining.
28
 Along the 
same lines, the incoming governor of Wisconsin, Scott Walker, announced that he 
will seek to eliminate almost all collective bargaining rights of state and local 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. Ben Smith & Maggie Haberman, Pols Turn on Labor Unions, POLITICO, June 6, 
2010, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0610/38183.html. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Amy Traub, War on Public Workers, THE NATION, July 5, 2010, at 5. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Jeff Crosby, Public Sector, Public Good, AFL-CIO NOW BLOG, Apr. 22, 2010, 
http://blog.aflcio.org/2010/04/22/public-sector-public-good/#more-28473. 
 26. Jennifer Feehan, Kasich Stand Worries Union; Attack on Bargaining Law Called 
‘Teachable Moment,’ THE BLADE (Toledo, OH), Dec. 31, 2010, at B1. 
 27. Steven Greenhouse, Strained States Turning to Laws to Curb Unions, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 4, 2011, at A1. 
 28. See Ignazio Messina, Shift of Control Gives GOP Votes to Greatly Alter Ohio’s 
Labor Law; Collective Bargaining for State Workers Among Issues, THE BLADE (Toledo, 
OH), Feb. 11, 2011, at A1 (discussing Senate Bill 5). 





 This is shocking not only because the bill is so radical, but also 
because Wisconsin adopted, around fifty years ago, the first public-sector collective 
bargaining law in the country.
30
 
Much of the real and perceived financial problems in this area involve pension 
plans. Notably, public-sector pension benefits and rules in most states are not set 
through collective bargaining, but rather through statute and regulation.
31
 Also, 
while some state plans have significant underfunding problems, in the aggregate, 
public-sector pension plans currently account for a total of 3.8% of state and local 
spending, which does not seem obviously out of balance.
32
 Still, the problem is 
real, at least in a number of places. Causes range from stock market declines, to 
underfunding due to questionable actuarial assumptions and political pressure to 
divert funds to other projects, to some overgenerous benefit formulas.
33
  
Certainly the stock market declines in recent years contributed to significant 
underfunding in a number of places. This, in turn, put additional strains on 
already-weakened public budgets. The Politico piece noted: 
 A recent study from the Pew Center on the States found that states 
are short $1 trillion toward the $3.35 trillion in pension, health care and 
other retirement benefits states have promised their current and retired 
workers, the product of a combination of political decisions and the 
recent recession. 
 But the immediate cause of the new spotlight on public sector 
unions is the collapse in tax revenues that came with the 2008 Wall 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. Mary Spicuzza & Clay Barbour, Walker: We Must Cut Power of Unions; Democrats 
and Public Workers Decry His Proposal to Eliminate Collective Bargaining, WIS. ST. J., 
Feb. 11, 2011, at A1.  
 30. See SLATER, supra note 4, at 158–93. 
 31. See Gerald W. McEntee, Editorial, Don’t Blame Public Pensions; Opposing View, 
USA TODAY, Jan. 18, 2011, at 9A (public-employee pension systems “predated public 
employee bargaining rights, and few plans are subject to the bargaining process today”). For 
example, in Ohio, pension benefits are set by statute and pension rules and benefits are not 
negotiable by unions. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §145.01-95 (LexisNexis 2007) (statute setting 
pension rules and benefits for public employees); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.10 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (provisions of laws pertaining to, inter alia, the retirement of public 
employees prevail over any provisions in a collective bargaining agreement). 
 32. ALICIA H. MUNNELL, JEAN-PIERRE AUBRY & LAURA QUINBY, CTR. FOR RET. 
RESEARCH, NO. 13, THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC PENSIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL BUDGETS 1 
(2010). 
 33. See David Lewin, Thomas Kochan, Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Teresa Ghilarducci, 
Harry Katz, Jeff Keefe, Daniel J.B. Mitchell, Craig Olson, Saul Rubinstein & Christian 
Weller, Getting It Right: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications from Research on 
Public-Sector Unionism and Collective Bargaining 11–12 (Emp’t Policy Research Network, 
Labor and Emp’t Relations Ass’n Working Paper Series, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1792942; Florence Olsen, Retirement: Assumptions About 
Investment Returns Set Public Pensions Apart, NASRA Says, 48 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. 
(BNA) 401 (Apr. 6, 2010). 
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California’s public employee pensions are perhaps in the worst condition. A 
recent study from the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, using 
economic assumptions the authors felt were more reliable than the officially 
approved standards the plan was using, found that prior to the 2008/2009 recession, 
the three major public-sector pension plans for the state had a combined funding 
shortfall of $425.2 billion.
35 
Then, between June 2008 and June 2009, these three 
pension funds lost a combined $109.7 billion, putting their ability to meet future 
obligations at risk.
36
 While this study contained recommendations to restore sound 
economic footing, the California pension problem has also inspired critiques less 
measured and more willing to blame unions—in books with titles like Plunder!: 
How Public Employee Unions Are Raiding Treasuries, Controlling Our Lives and 
Bankrupting the Nation, for example.
37
 
In some cases, these problems have been exaggerated. A coalition of ten 
organizations representing state and local government employers issued a fact sheet 
on January 26, 2011, stating that state and local government pension funds on the 
whole “are not in crisis.”38 It concluded that “[m]ost state and local government 
employee retirement systems have substantial assets to weather the economic 
crisis; those that are underfunded are taking steps to strengthen funding.”39 Some 
have disputed claims, such as those made by the Stanford Institute for Economic 
Policy Research, that public pension fund managers make overly optimistic 
assumptions about investment returns.
40
 Another independent study explains that  
the extent of public pension liabilities varies widely among the states 
and local governments. Some pension plans are fully funded, while 
others have seen their funding levels drop below 80 percent. In most 
cases, pension funding shortfalls are the result of the cyclical nature of 
the economy, which was particularly severe in the 2008–2009 period. 
In a minority of cases, unfunded liabilities can be directly traced to the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 34. Smith & Haberman, supra note 21. 
 35. See HOWARD BORNSTEIN, STAN MARKUZE, CAMERON PERCY, LISHA WANG & 
MORITZ ZANDER, STANFORD INST. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH, GOING FOR BROKE: 
REFORMING CALIFORNIA’S PUBLIC EMPLOYEE PENSION SYSTEMS (2010), available at 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/siepr/cgibin/siepr/?q=/system/files/shared/GoingforBroke_pb
.pdf. 
 36. Id.  
 37. STEVEN GREENHUT, PLUNDER!: HOW PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONS ARE RAIDING 
TREASURIES, CONTROLLING OUR LIVES AND BANKRUPTING THE NATION (2009). 
 38. Retirement: Public Pensions ‘Not in Crisis,’ Group Says, Pointing to ‘Substantial 
Assets’ for Long Run, 49 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 162 (Feb. 8, 2011). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 33 (quoting Keith Brainard, Research Director, National 
Association of State Retirement Administrators). 
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failure of public officials to properly fund the pension system over a 
period of many years.
41
 
Further, the benefit levels in many public-sector pensions systems are far from 
overly generous. “State pensions in Massachusetts average less than $26,000” a 
year.
42
 Also, nearly a third of all state and local government employees (including 
this author) do not earn social security retirement benefits. This is because public 
employment in some states is not covered by social security.
43
 One survey reported 
the following average pension benefits: California, $2,008 per month or $24,097 
per year; Colorado, $2,278 per month or $27,339 per year (and no social security); 
Florida, $1,468 per month or $17,617 per year; and Ohio, $1,961 per month or 
$23,535 per year (and no social security).
44
 
Also, states have cut back on their contributions to public employee pension 
plans; one study estimates this increased the funding shortfall by $80 billion.
45
 
Public employers made insufficient contributions to pension plans when the stock 
market was doing well. It was convenient politics—although poor economics—to 
assume this would continue indefinitely.
46
 Actuarial assumption regulation is one 
area for potential reform. For example, rules on the actuarial assumptions that can 
be used in public-sector pension financing could be tightened such that plan 
administrators and politicians could not assume, for example, unrealistically high 
rates of return on investments or unrealistically low rates of retirement.
47
 Notably, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 41. CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL GOV’T EXCELLENCE, STATE AND LOCAL PENSIONS: AN 
OVERVIEW OF FUNDING ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 2 (2011), available at http://www.slge.org/ 
vertical/Sites/%7BA260E1DF-5AEE-459D-84C4-876EFE1E4032%7D/uploads/%7BDE913A11-
1C4F-475D-BF0E-1662B0C67612%7D.PDF. 
 42. Crosby, supra note 25. 
 43. See Dean Baker, The Public Pension Outrage and Alan Greenspan’s Pension, 
TRUTHOUT (Aug. 16, 2010), http://archive.truthout.org/the-public-pension-outrage-and-alan-
greenspans-pension62358; see also Retirement Planner: State and Local Government 
Employment, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/retire2/stateandlocal.htm (Social 
Security Administration website page noting that some public employment is not covered by 
social security). Around 30% of state and local government employees are not covered by 
social security, including teachers in California and Texas. Thomas Margenau, Social 
Security Offsets: Policies Public Employees Love to Hate and Don’t Understand, THE 
CONTRIBUTOR, Summer 2007, at 2, 3, available at http://www.nagdca.org/ 
content.cfm/id/contributor32007social_security_offsets_policies_public_employees_love_to
_hate_and_dont_understand. Ohio public employees (including law professors at public 
universities) are also excluded from social security. See, e.g., Eickelberger v. Eickelberger, 
638 N.E.2d 130, 134 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (“Appellant, as a public employee, does not 
participate in the Social Security system. Instead, appellant participates in the Public 
Employee Retirement System (‘PERS’) governed by R.C. Chapter 145.”). 
 44. NAT’L INST. ON RET. SEC., PENSIONOMICS: MEASURING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
STATE AND LOCAL PENSION PLANS (50 STATE FACT SHEETS) (2009), available at 
http://www.nirsonline.org/storage/nirs/documents/NIRS_NEI_state_factsheets.pdf.  
 45. DAVID MADLAND & NICK BUNKER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND, STATE 
BUDGET DEFICITS ARE NOT AN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION PROBLEM: THE GREAT RECESSION 
IS TO BLAME 7 (2011).  
 46. Id.  
 47. See Olsen, supra note 33; MADLAND & BUNKER, supra note 45, at 7. 
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the law that governs private-sector pensions on this and other issues, the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), does not apply to the public sector.
48
 
Still, real problems exist. One study estimates that the total unfunded obligation 
for local government pension plans could be as high as $574 billion, and the 
unfunded obligation for all public pension plans is approximately $3 trillion.
49
 The 
study also predicts that only five major systems have pension assets sufficient to 
pay already-promised benefits through 2025, and only twenty-nine systems have 
assets sufficient to pay such benefits through 2050.
50
 On a more micro level, rules 
of defined benefit pension plans (still fairly common in the public sector) can 
sometimes be gamed. For example, defined benefit plan formulas are typically 
based on some multiple of the employee’s average compensation in his or her last 
few years of work.
51
 Employees can, in their last few years of employment, 
manipulate their average compensation through promotion, working unusually 
large amounts of overtime, or otherwise artificially raising their pay well above the 
norm for their careers.
52
 Some systems are arguably too generous in allowing 
individuals to draw multiple public pensions. Some have required little or no 
employee contributions.  
Such issues have prompted some significant changes. Since 2010, forty-one 
states have enacted significant changes to at least one of their statewide retirement 
plans. Eighteen have increased pension contribution requirements. Twelve have 
reduced the automatic cost of living adjustment on benefits.
53
 These acts increased 
employee contributions to retirement plans, reduced benefits, or both. For example, 
Illinois passed a law in May 2010 altering benefits for all of the state’s five pension 
systems, including “raising the retirement age, limiting pension raises, capping 
maximum benefits and ending public pensions for [retirees] who work another 
public job.”54 Georgia also made “changes . . . to its re-employment-after-
retirement rules, providing that if a retiring employee has not reached normal 
retirement age on the date of retirement and returns to any paid service, his or her 
application for retirement is nullified.”55 (Interestingly, but not surprisingly, there 
have been no proposals to similarly amend what is by far the most generous public-
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 4(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (2006). 
 49. See Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua Rauh, The Crisis in Local Government Pensions in 
the United States, in GROWING OLD: PAYING FOR RETIREMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL MONEY 
MANAGEMENT AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 47, 48–49 (Yasuyuki Fuchita, Richard J. 
Herring & Robert E. Litan eds., 2011). 
 50. See id. at 70–71 tbl.3-7.  
 51. See PETER A. DIAMOND, ALICIA H. MUNNELL, GREGORY LEISERSON & JEAN-PIERRE 
AUBRY, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH, NO. 12, PROBLEMS WITH STATE-LOCAL FINAL PAY PLANS 
AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM 2 (2010). 
 52. See id. at 3–5.  
 53. Monica Davey, Many Workers in Public Sector Retiring Sooner, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
6, 2011, at A18. 
 54. See Smith & Haberman, supra note 21.  
 55. Tripp Baltz, Retirement: Facing Long-Term Pension Problems, States Are Turning 
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In October 2010, California enacted changes to its pension plan for state 
employees.
57
 The Act increased the amount current employees must contribute 
toward their retirements; decreased pension benefits to newly hired employees; and 
changed the pension calculation to use the average of the three highest salary years, 
not the single highest year.
58
 The Act also contains “transparency” provisions that 
require the California Public Employees’ Retirement System to submit specific 
information to the legislature, governor, and state treasurer regarding contribution 




B. Are Public Employees “Overpaid”? 
While studies on this point do not all agree, the more careful studies show that, 
comparing similar workers with similar credentials in similar jobs, public 
employees are more often paid less than comparable private-sector workers.
60
 
Nevertheless, the first wave of attacks on public-sector workers included claims 
that they were overpaid. 
For example, Andrew Biggs, of the American Enterprise Institute, wrote that 
federal workers are significantly overpaid relative to private-sector workers.
61
 
“Even after including the full range of control variables in our own analysis, we 
found that federal workers continue to earn a pay premium of around 12 percent 
over private workers.”62 
In contrast, though, a study by the Office of Personnel Management concluded 
that two of the main studies purporting to show that federal employees were paid 
more than private-sector workers (from the Heritage Foundation and the Cato 
Institute) were inaccurate.
63
 The figures on which Cato and Heritage relied, from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, “look only at gross averages, including retail 
and restaurant service workers and other entry-level positions that reduce private 
sector average pay in comparison to the Federal average, which does not include 
many of these categories in its workforce.”64 Also, the federal sector includes a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 56. See M.S., America’s Most Generous Public Pension, Democracy in America, 
ECONOMIST (Aug. 10, 2010, 8:46 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/ 
democracyinamerica/2010/08/pension_funding. 
 57. See Act of Oct. 20, 2010, ch. 3, 2010 Cal. Stat. 5152 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of CAL. GOV’T CODE).  
 58. Laura Mahoney, State Employees: Governor to Sign Pact with Rollbacks of 
Pensions 100 Days into Fiscal Year, 195 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), A18 (Oct. 8, 2010). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Andrew G. Biggs & Jason Richwine, Those Underpaid Government Workers, AM. 
SPECTATOR, Sept. 2010, at 28, 28. 
 61. Id. at 28–29. 
 62. Id. at 29. 
 63. See Laura D. Francis, Compensation: OPM, NTEU Dispute Reports That Feds Paid 
Twice as Much as Private Sector, 48 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 994 (Aug. 24, 2010). 
 64. Id. (quoting John Berry, Director, Office of Personnel Management). 
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significantly higher percentage of highly specialized and professional employees, 
who are actually paid less than their private-sector counterparts.
65
 
Generally, studies that find public workers are overpaid tend to look at gross 
average pay or median pay but do not take into account the different types of jobs 
in the public sector and, sometimes, the different kinds of workers.
66
 Simply 
looking at aggregate data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics makes it seem as if 
public workers earn more on average than private workers, but the gap disappears 
completely when one compares similar workers (including age, experience, and 
education) in similar jobs.
67
 There are many more professional jobs in the public 
sector, and fewer unskilled service jobs.
68
 
Biggs has also argued that public employees generally may be receiving greater 
benefits.  
Public employees receive pensions that are about twice as large for 
each dollar of contributions as do private-sector employees. That is, 
assuming each worker (and his employer) contribute a given amount 
toward pensions each year, public-sector workers receive a guaranteed 
benefit at retirement that’s about twice as high. . . . [T]his is a result of 
bogus pension accounting at the state level, which allows state pensions 
to assume they can earn high investment returns without risk. As a 
result, public pensions are underfunded by more than $3 trillion. 
Nevertheless, it’s the taxpayer, not public-sector retirees, who bear the 
costs of this. 
 Second, more than 80 percent of public-sector workers are eligible 
for retiree health benefits (often referred to as OPEBs, or Other Post-
Employment Benefits), versus only around one-third in the private 
sector. OPEBs generally provide full coverage from the time a 
government worker retirees [sic] (often in their early to mid-50s) up 
until Medicare starts at age 65. . . . (Private-sector retiree health 
coverage, where it exists, is generally less generous, with higher 
deductibles and co-pays.) . . . [T]he Pew Center on the States reports 
that states currently owe around $500 for OPEBs . . . . That means that 
public-sector employees have effectively received an additional $500 
billion in deferred compensation that is currently off the books.
69
 
On the other hand, a recent study from the National Institute on Retirement 
Security concluded: 
Wages and salaries of state and local employees are lower than those 
for private sector workers with comparable earnings determinants (e.g., 
education). State employees typically earn 11 percent less; local 
workers earn 12 percent less. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 65. See id.  
 66. Biggs & Richwine, supra note 60. 
 67. See Joseph A. McCartin, Convenient Scapegoats: Public Workers Under Assault, 
DISSENT, Spring 2011, at 45, 45–46. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Andrew Biggs, ‘Public Employees Get More Benefits,’ ENTERPRISE BLOG (July 28, 
2010, 10:02 AM), http://blog.american.com/2010/07/public-employees-get-more-benefits/. 
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 Over the last 20 years, the earnings for state and local employees 
have generally declined relative to comparable private sector 
employees. . . . 
 Benefits (e.g., pensions) comprise a greater share of employee 
compensation in the public sector. 
 [Still] [s]tate and local employees have lower total compensation 
than their private sector counterparts. On average, total compensation is 
6.8 percent lower for state employees and 7.4 percent lower for local 
workers, compared with comparable private sector employees.
70
 
Several new, specific, and sophisticated studies also find that public workers 
are, if anything, underpaid relative to the private sector. Economists at the Center 
for Economic and Policy Research studied workers in New England, and found that 
while the average state or local government employee there earns higher wages 
than the average private-sector worker, that is because public workers are, on 
average, older and much better educated.
71
 Specifically, over half of state and local 
government employees in New England have a four-year college degree or more, 
and roughly 30% have an advanced degree.
72
 Only 38% of private-sector workers 
have a four-year college degree or more, and only 13% have an advanced degree.
73
 
Also, the typical state and local worker in New England is about four years older 
than the typical private-sector worker.
74
 After adjusting for these factors, public-
sector wages were generally lower than private-sector wages.
75
 While the lowest 
paid public workers earned slightly more than their private-sector counterparts, for 
engineers, professors, and others in the higher-paid professional jobs, the wage 
penalty for being a public worker was almost 13%.
76
 
Such studies have been done for states across the nation and for specific public 
employers. For example, a study from Georgia State University analyzing data 
from across the nation found that “[h]olding constant education, estimated work 
experience, occupation, location, race, and gender . . . [public] employees earned 4 
to 6% less than comparable private sector workers in 1990, 2000, and 2005–
06 . . . .”77 Focusing more narrowly, a study by the chief economist in the office of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 70. KEITH A. BENDER & JOHN S. HEYWOOD, OUT OF BALANCE?: COMPARING PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE SECTOR COMPENSATION OVER 20 YEARS 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.nirsonline.org/storage/nirs/documents/final_out_of_balance_report_april_2010.p
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 71. Jeffrey Thompson & John Schmitt, The Wage Penalty for State and Local 
Government Employees in New England 3 (Ctr. for Econ. & Policy Research, Working 
Paper No. 232, 2010), available at http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/ 
working_papers/working_papers_201-250/WP233.pdf. 
 72. Id. at 5. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Gregory B. Lewis & Chester S. Galloway, A National Analysis of Public/Private 
Wage Differentials at the State and Local Levels by Race and Gender 22 (Ga. State Univ. 
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the New York City Comptroller found that employees in the New York City 




The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) has also compared public- and 
private-sector compensation in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Ohio, states with 
relatively strong union presence and relatively robust public-sector collective 
bargaining statutes.
79
 For Michigan, the study concluded that, after controlling for 
education, experience, organizational size, gender, race, ethnicity, citizenship, and 
disabilities, full-time state and local government workers are undercompensated by 
approximately 5.3% compared to the private sector (2.9% when annual hours 
worked are factored in).
80
 For Wisconsin, the study found that public employees are 
undercompensated by 8.2% (4.8% when annual hours worked are factored in).
81
 
For Ohio, the study found that public workers are undercompensated by 5.9% 
(3.5% when hours are factored in).
82
 
An EPI study made similar findings on a national scale. Looking at public and 
private workers nationwide, it found a slight undercompensation of public 
employees on a cost per hour basis, after controlling for education, experience, 
hours, employer size, gender, race, ethnicity, and disability.
83
 On average, full-time 




A very recent overview, surveying the research on this issue, concluded: 
The existing research, much of which is very current (completed within 
the past two years), shows that, if anything, public employees are 
underpaid relative to their private-sector counterparts. While 
public-sector benefits are higher than private sector counterparts, total 
compensation (including health care and retirement benefits) is lower 
than that of comparable private-sector employees. Erosion of public-
sector pay and benefits will make it harder for public employers to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 78. John Herzfeld, Public Employees: Municipal Pay Below Private Sector, New York 
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employees (1.8%) than for state government workers (7.6%). Id. 
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C. Collective Bargaining Rights Are Not Correlated with State Deficits 
The claim that public employees are overpaid is often linked to the claim that 
collective bargaining rights for public workers increases their compensation to the 
point that it is a significant cause of state budget deficits. But no significant 
correlation between public-sector bargaining rights and state deficit levels has been 
shown. At a recent hearing on this issue, Rep. Mike Quigley observed that states 
that allow public-sector collective bargaining on average have a 14% deficit 
relative to their budgets, while states that bar collective bargaining have 16.5% 
deficits.
86
 For example, Texas, which has essentially no public-sector collective 
bargaining and very low levels of unionization, has one of the worst budget deficits 
in the nation.
87
 Nevada, which has no collective bargaining rights for state 
employees, also has one of the largest state budget deficits in the country.
88
 In 
contrast, some states with strong public-sector bargaining laws, including those at 
the center of these debates, have smaller than average deficits. Wisconsin was 
projected to have a deficit of 12.8% of its budget in fiscal year 2012, Ohio 11%, 
and Iowa 3.5%.
89
 In contrast, North Carolina, which bars all public-sector 
collective bargaining, is running a projected deficit of 20% in 2012.
90
 
Nonetheless, opponents of public-sector unions insist on making dubious 
assumptions and links. For example, a recent piece in the conservative National 
Affairs argued: 
When all jobs are considered, state and local public-sector workers 
today earn, on average, $14 more per hour in total compensation 
(wages and benefits) than their private-sector counterparts. . . . 
 When unions have not been able to secure increases in wages and 
salaries, they have turned their attention to benefits. . . . Of special 
interest to the unions has been health care: Across the nation, 86% of 
state- and local-government workers have access to employer-provided 
health insurance, while only 45% of private-sector workers do. . . . 
 The unions’ other cherished benefit is public-employee pensions. . . . 
 How, one might ask, were policymakers ever convinced to agree to 
such generous terms? As it turns out, many lawmakers found that 
increasing pensions was very good politics. They placated unions with 
future pension commitments . . . . 
 Public-sector unions thus distort the labor market, weaken public 
finances, and diminish the responsiveness of government and the 
quality of public services. Many of the concerns that initially led 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. Lewin et al., supra note 33, at 2. 
 86. State Employees: House Panel Debates State Budget Problems, Whether Bargaining 
Rights Need to Be Cut, 25 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 700 (Apr. 21, 2011). 
 87. MADLAND & BUNKER, supra note 45, at 4. 
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policymakers to oppose collective bargaining by government 
employees have, over the years, been vindicated.
91
 
For reasons described above and for reasons I have argued elsewhere,
92
 I think 
that these arguments are flawed and that the concluding sentence above is wrong. It 
is especially troubling to see public-sector unions and public-sector collective 
bargaining blamed for pension problems given that, again, in the vast majority of 
jurisdictions, public-sector unions are not even permitted to bargain about 
pensions.
93
 The debate is often highly partisan (unions disproportionately support 
Democrats, Republicans disproportionately disapprove of unions), which can make 
the search for the truth more difficult.
94
 But public-sector unions in the age of 
Obama will have to counter such narratives, and the first round has gone to labor’s 
opponents. 
D. The New Laws 
In late 2010 through the first half of 2011, a number of states passed laws 
restricting—and in some cases, eliminating or practically eliminating—the 
collective bargaining rights of public-sector workers and their unions. 
1. Wisconsin 
Prior to recent amendment, Wisconsin had two fairly similar public-sector labor 
statutes: one covering local and county government employees,
95
 and the other 
covering state employees.
96
 Ironically, the former was the first state law permitting 
public-sector collective bargaining in the country, enacted in 1959.
97
 The “Budget 
Repair Bill” recently signed by Gov. Scott Walker98 makes sweeping revisions to 
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 95. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (West Supp. 2010) (amended 2011).  
 96. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.81 (West Supp. 2010) (amended 2011). 
 97. SLATER, supra note 4, at 158. 
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First, the Act eliminated collective bargaining rights entirely for some 
employees: University of Wisconsin (UW) system employees, employees of the 
UW Hospitals and Clinics Authority, and certain home care and childcare 
providers.
100
 It generally limited collective bargaining to bargaining over a 
percentage of total base wages increase that is no greater than the percentage 
change in the consumer price index.
101
 No other issues can be negotiated.
102
 
Second, the Act imposes right-to-work rules for all Wisconsin employees except 
those in “protective occupations.”103 This means it is now illegal for unions and 
employers to agree to “fair share” union security clauses under which members of a 
union bargaining unit are obligated to pay that portion of their dues which goes to 
representing the bargaining unit in matters related to collective bargaining.
104
 
Further, the Act made it illegal for an employer to agree to automatic dues 
deduction for employees, even for those who wish to pay dues.
105
 
Third, the Act created an unprecedented mandatory recertification system under 
which every union faces a recertification election every year.
106
 A union will only 
be recertified if 51% of the employees in the collective bargaining unit—not merely 
those voting—voted for recertification.107 So, for example, if a bargaining unit had 
400 members and the recertification vote was 201 favoring union representation 
and 100 against, the union would be decertified because 201 is less than 51% of 
400. This is a change from the prior system under which (consistent with the 
NLRA and other public-sector laws) a request from 30% of the bargaining unit was 
required to schedule a decertification election, decertification elections could not 
take place during the terms of valid union contracts (except for a required “window 
period” every three years allowing a decertification election), and the majority of 
those voting determined the outcome.
108
 
The Act also limited the duration of collective bargaining agreements to one 
year, which is very unusual in labor law.
109
 Further, the law now requires that 
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employees pay one-half of all the required contributions to their retirement 
system.
110
 Previously, the amount of employee contributions was negotiable—for 




On June 14, 2011, the Wisconsin Supreme Court overturned an injunction that 
Judge Maryann Sumi previously granted against this law (based on an alleged 
violation of the state Open Meetings Law requiring twenty-four hours’ notice of 
certain legislative actions).
112
 The law is now in effect. 
The law has prompted considerable political activity, from massive protests in 
Madison to recall efforts aimed at both Republicans (six recall elections were 
certified) who voted for the bill and Democrats (three recall elections were 
certified) who fled the state in an attempt to block the bill by preventing a 
legislative quorum.
113
 As of Summer 2011, nine recall elections have taken place; 
Democrats prevailed in five, thus adding two net Democrats to the Wisconsin 
Senate.
114
 Also, this issue obviously affected the Wisconsin Supreme Court justice 
race between David Prosser and JoAnne Kloppenburg (Prosser ultimately 





Ohio has a public-sector labor law applicable to most public employees.
116
 
Enacted in the early 1980s, it even allows most public workers to strike.
117
 A new 
bill signed into law but later repealed, Senate Bill No. 5 (“SB 5”), was designed to 
profoundly alter this law.
118
After the bill was signed into law, enough signatures 
were gathered to put the law “on hold” until a voter referendum scheduled for 
November 2011 could determine whether the law would go into effect.
119
 Though 
                                                                                                                 
collective bargaining agreements to one year. 
 110. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 59.875(2) (West Supp. 2011). 
 111. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 169.59.875, 167.62.623 (West Supp. 2010) (amended 2011). 
 112. State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, 798 N.W.2d 436, 438 (Wis. 2011).  
 113. A. G. Sulzberger, Union Bill Is Law, but Debate Is Far from Over, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 
11, 2011, at A14. 
 114. Democratic Sen. Dave Hansen Wins Recall Election, 1330 WHBL SHEBOYGAN’S 
NEWS RADIO, (July 19, 2011, 8:11 PM), http://whbl.com/news/articles/2011/jul/19/ 
demorcatic-sen-dave-hansen-wins-recall-election/. 
 115. Scott Bauer, Opponent’s Concession Seals Deal for Prosser; Kloppenburg Says the 
Recount Should Serve as a “Wake-Up Call.”; Supreme Court, WIS. ST. J., June 1, 2011, at 
A1. 
 116. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.01–.27 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011).  
 117. See 1983 Ohio Laws 361; OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 4117.15 (LexisNexis Supp. 
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the bill was eventually defeated in a voter referendum,
120
 SB 5 would have done the 
following things, among others. 
SB 5 would have eliminated collective bargaining rights entirely for certain 
employees, including at least most college and university faculty, lower level 
supervisors in police and fire departments, and employees of charter schools.
121
 It 
would also have limited the bargaining rights of some other employees, including 
regional council of government employees and certain members of the unclassified 




For employees who can bargain, SB 5 would have eliminated both the right to 
strike for public employees who currently have that right (all public employees 
with the exception of police, fire, and a few other small categories)
123
 and the right 
to binding interest arbitration at impasse for employees who cannot legally 
strike.
124
 SB 5 would have provided stiff penalties (two days’ pay for each day 
striking and removal) for striking or instigating a strike.
125
 Encouraging or 
condoning a strike would also have been forbidden.
126
 
Instead of the right to strike when bargaining reaches impasse
127
 (or, for public 
safety employees, instead of the right to have a neutral interest arbitrator issue a 
binding order on contract terms),
128
 SB 5 would have left the parties with only 
non-binding mediation and fact finding.
129
 Under the bill, if these did not lead to an 
agreement, the governing legislative body (often the employer itself) would simply 
have been able to choose to adopt the employer’s final offer.130 In fact finding, a 
neutral party makes factual findings and issues recommendations as to contract 
terms. Under the bill, the employer or a majority of the union could have then 
rejected a fact finder’s recommendations131 (under the law currently in effect, a 
three-fifths vote is required to reject).
132
 Under the bill, if either side rejected the 
recommendations, the parties’ last best offers were submitted to the legislative 
body of the public employer to make a selection as to contract terms.
133
 The bill 
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would have required the public employer’s last best offer to become the agreement 
if the legislative body were to fail to choose.
134
 For certain employers, if the 
legislative body selected the last best offer that costs more, and the CFO of the 
legislative body could not or refused to determine whether sufficient funds existed 
to cover the agreement, the last best offers would have been submitted to the 
voters.
135
 Unlike the law currently in effect, in which parties can mutually agree to 
a wide range of procedures to resolve bargaining impasses,
136
 this is the only 
impasse procedure SB 5 would have allowed. 
SB 5 would also have imposed “right-to-work” rules by barring “fair share” 
agreements.
137
 As in Wisconsin, the effect (and, at least arguably, purpose) of this 
rule is to deny unions financial resources. SB 5 would also have barred public 
employers from agreeing to provide payroll deductions for any contributions to a 




Further, the bill would have restricted the scope of bargaining and expanded the 
list of subjects that were inappropriate for collective bargaining. It specified that the 
following would not be bargainable: (1) employer-paid employee contributions to 
retirement systems, (2) health care benefits (except the amount of the premium the 
employer and employees pay, although the provision of health care benefits for 
which the employer is required to pay more than 85% of the costs is not 
negotiable), (3) privatization or contracting out of a public employer’s work, and 
(4) the number of employees required to be on duty or employed.
139
 It would also 
have permitted public employers to not bargain on any subject reserved to the 
management of the governmental unit, even if the subject affected wages, hours, 
and terms and conditions of employment.
140
 It would have barred collective 
bargaining agreements (CBAs) from providing for an hourly overtime payment rate 
that exceeded the overtime rate required by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
(FLSA).
141
 It would also have barred CBAs from containing provisions for certain 
types of leave to accrue above listed amounts or to pay out for sick leave at a rate 
higher than specified amounts.
142
 It would have barred grievances and arbitrations 
based on past practice of the parties.
143
 
SB 5 would have further restricted bargaining in education, including barring 
negotiating on the minimum number of personnel, on anything that restricted the 
employer’s ability to assign personnel, and on the maximum number of students 
assigned to a class or teacher.
144
 Also, employers would have been prevented from 
                                                                                                                 
§ 4117.14(D)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011)). 
 134. Id. (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(D)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011)). 
 135. Id. (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(D)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011)). 
 136. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(C) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011). 
 137. See Ohio Amended Substitute S. B. 5, § 1 (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 4117.09(C) (LexisNexis 2006)). 
 138. Id. (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.09(C) (LexisNexis 2006)). 
 139. Id. (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.08(B) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011)). 
 140. Id. (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.08(C) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011)). 
 141. Id. (creating OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.106(C)). 
 142. Id. (creating OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.108–.109). 
 143. Id. (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.10(A)). 
 144. Id. (creating OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.081(B)(1)–(3)). 
208 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:189 
 
 
agreeing to any restriction on the public employer’s authority to acquire any 
products, programs, or services from educational service centers.
145
 
The bill would also have given greater rights to a public employer in a state of 
fiscal emergency or under “fiscal watch” to terminate, modify, or negotiate the 
agreement.
146
 The bill seemingly would have repealed the “contract bar” rule 
(under which a decertification petition cannot be filed while a CBA is in effect, 
unless it is during the “window period” every three years).147 Also, it would have 




The bill was repealed via a voter referendum, which was held in November 
2011.  Had the bill been passed, it would have been a truly radical change. 
3. Other States 
While Wisconsin and Ohio have gotten the most press, other states where 
Republicans control most or all of state government have also passed bills limiting 
the collective bargaining rights of public workers. 
Alabama passed a bill (Alabama Act No. 2010-761) making it a crime to 
arrange for public employee payments “by salary deduction or otherwise” to 
political action committees (PACs) or organizations including unions that use part 
of the money for “political activity.”149 That law has been enjoined by the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, on the grounds that the statute 
is overbroad regarding activities protected by the First Amendment and that it is too 
vague to provide adequate notice.
150
 The state is appealing.
151
 
Idaho enacted a series of bills that curtail teachers’ collective bargaining 
rights.
152
 Senate Bill 1108 limits such bargaining to wages and benefits.
153
 It also 
eliminates teacher seniority protections during layoffs and replaces tenure-track 
contracts for new teachers with renewable agreements of one or two years.
154
 As in 
Ohio, this enacted bill is facing a campaign for repeal via a referendum.
155
 
Indiana enacted a statute significantly limiting the scope of bargaining for 
teachers.
156
 For example, the statute forbids the parties to agree on certain topics in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 145. Id. (creating OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.081(B)(7)). 
 146. Id. (creating OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.104(A)–(B)). 
 147. Id. (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(C) (LexisNexis 2006)). 
 148. Id. § 2 (repealing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.22 (LexisNexis 2006)). 
 149. Elliot T. Dube, Union Dues: Alabama Appeals Injunction Enjoining Statute Barring 
Public Worker Deductions for Politics, 49 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 433 (Apr. 5, 2011). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id.  
 152. Amy Linn, Collective Bargaining: Idaho Governor Signs Measure Weakening 
Teacher Bargaining; Foes Launch Referendum, 49 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 506 (Apr. 
19, 2011). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Nora Macaluso, State Laws: Indiana Governor Signs Bill Limiting Teachers’ 
Collective Bargaining Rights, 82 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-5 (Apr. 28, 2011). 
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a contract that were formally “permissive” topics of negotiation (subjects on which 
unions and employers were legally allowed to agree but were not required to 
negotiate over unless both sides agree).
157
 It also appears to bar arbitration over 




In Michigan, the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability 
Act allows the governor to appoint an “emergency manager” for local governments 
experiencing a “financial emergency.”159 The manager can reject, modify, or 
terminate any terms of CBAs with public-sector unions.
160
 A pair of Detroit 
municipal pension funds have filed suits alleging that this violates the Contracts 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
161
 Also in Michigan, a proposed bill would 
increase the penalties for striking teachers (all public-employee strikes in Michigan 
are illegal), including suspension or revocation of teaching licenses.
162
 Further, 
Michigan enacted a bill (House Bill No. 4522) that requires interest arbitrators, in 
cases involving municipal police, fire, and emergency medical personnel, to give 
the highest priority in their decisions to the public employer’s ability to pay.163 This 
factor, generally seen as favoring employers, now trumps other factors arbitrators 
must or may consider.
164
 
Nebraska enacted a bill (Legislative Bill 397) that makes changes to the rules 
governing the interest arbitrations run by the Nebraska Commission of Industrial 
Relations (CIR).
165
 These changes, while somewhat technical, are designed to 
produce lower compensation awards. Under the new law, the CIR must follow a 
more specific set of criteria in finding and considering “comparable” groups of 
employees with regard to wage issues.
166
 Also, the new law mandates CIR to 
include pension and health benefits in making compensation comparisons, and to 
order changes in wages only when total compensation falls outside a range of 98% 
to 102% of the comparison midpoint.
167
 Among other things, the law creates a 
preference in wage comparisons for geographic proximity; requires out-of-state 
wage information to be adjusted to reflect the Nebraska cost-of-living; authorizes 
                                                                                                                 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. 2011 Ind. Acts 575 § 22. 
 159. Act of Mar. 16, 2011, Act 4, § 15(1)(4). 
 160. Id. § 19(1)(k). 
 161. State Laws: CRS Suggests Michigan Bargaining Law Could Violate Constitution’s 
Contract Clause, 25 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 685 (Apr. 14, 2011); Nora Macaluso, State Laws; 
Detroit Pension Systems Sue Michigan over New Emergency Manager Statute, 76 Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) A-8 (Apr. 20, 2011). 
 162. Catherine Jun, Tougher Teacher No-Strike Law Pushed, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 30, 
2011, at A1. 
 163. Nora Macaluso, Collective Bargaining: Michigan Law Links Municipal Finances, 
Binding Arbitration in Employee Disputes, 49 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 948 (July 26, 
2011). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Christopher Brown, Collective Bargaining: Nebraska Law Reins in Agency 
Overseeing Labor Disputes with Public Sector Unions, 49 Gov’t Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 728 
(June 7, 2011). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
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appeals from CIR orders directly to the Nebraska Supreme Court; and requires a 
public vote on any last, best offer of a union or an employer.
168
 Union leaders 




Nevada enacted Senate Bill No. 98, which reduces the number of 
public-employee supervisors eligible to engage in collective bargaining.
170
 It also 
mandates clauses that would reopen labor contracts during fiscal emergencies.
171
 
This affects only local government and their employees, since state employees in 
Nevada do not have collective bargaining rights.
172
 Specifically, the new law states 
that employees who make budgetary decisions and who have authority on behalf of 
the employer to hire, fire, discipline, and negotiate labor contracts for management 
are not covered by the collective bargaining law.
173
 It also makes ineligible doctors 
employed by a local government and civil lawyers who are assigned to a civil law 
division, department, or agency.
174
 
New Hampshire enacted Senate Bill No. 1, which eliminates the requirement 
that the terms of a collective bargaining agreement automatically continue if an 
impasse is not resolved at the time of the expiration of such agreement.
175
 About 
three months later, New Hampshire adopted House Bill 589, which repealed a 2007 
law that provided for mandatory card check recognition (that is, the employer must 
recognize a union if a majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit sign 
cards indicating they want that union to represent them).
176
 
The New Hampshire House, on March 30, 2011, approved legislation (House 
Bill No. 2) that would eliminate the negotiated terms of employment for public 
workers and make them “at-will” employees at the end of a CBA’s term.177 Also, 
on April 20, 2011, the New Hampshire Senate passed a “right-to-work” bill that 
would apply to both public- and private-sector unions.
178
 The New Hampshire 
Senate passed the latter bill by a large enough margin to override a gubernatorial 
veto but, as of this writing, it has not yet been enacted.
179
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 170. William H. Carlile, Collective Bargaining: Nevada Governor Signs Measure 
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New Jersey enacted Senate Bill No. 2937, which mandates significant cutbacks 
in pension and health benefits for public employees.
180
 It also enacted Assembly 
Bill No. 3393, which caps wage increases at 2% for New Jersey police and 
firefighter arbitration awards for contracts expiring between January 1, 2011, and 
April 1, 2014.
181
 Further, Assembly Bill No. 3393 placed serious restrictions on 
interest arbitrators.
182
 Arbitrators will now be randomly selected (as opposed to the 
previous process of mutual selection); arbitrator compensation is limited to $1,000 
per day and $7,500 per case; and arbitrators will be penalized $1,000 per day for 




Oklahoma, in House Bill No. 1593, repealed a 2004 law requiring cities with 
populations of at least 35,000 to engage in collective bargaining with unions.
184
 As 
in Wisconsin, this change does not affect police officers and firefighters, who, in 
Oklahoma, are covered by a separate statute.
185
 However, a separate bill is pending 




Tennessee eliminated collective bargaining for public school teachers in House 
Bill No. 130 and in Senate Bill No. 113.
187
 This law deletes the state’s Education 
Professional Negotiations Act of 1978 (Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-601) and replaces 
it with language providing for “collaborative conferencing.”188 Teachers now will 
be represented by groups that receive at least 15% of votes in a confidential poll 
rather than a particular union or recognized professional employees’ association.189 
Local school boards may meet with teachers’ representatives to try to reach 
agreement on issues such as pay, benefits, working conditions, leave, and grievance 
procedures.
190
 But the new law prohibits discussing certain issues during the 
conferences: differentiated pay plans or incentive compensation programs; 
expenditures of grants or awards designated for specific purposes; employee 
evaluations; staffing decisions and certain “innovative educational programs” 
                                                                                                                 
 
 180. Lorraine McCarthy, Retirement/Health Benefits: New Jersey Lawmakers Approve 
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approved by lawmakers; personnel decisions regarding employee assignment; and 
payroll deductions for political activities.
191
 
E. The Radical Nature of the Changes 
As discussed above, significant evidence contradicts claims that these laws 
would help with budget problems. Public workers are not “overpaid,” problems in 
pension underfunding are generally not related to collective bargaining rights, and 
there is no real correlation between collective bargaining rights and the levels of 
state deficits. 
Further, many of the new rules obviously have no relation to state budgets or 
employee compensation; instead, they are meant to damage unions as institutions. 
Notably, “right-to-work rules” that bar “fair share” agreements only go to whether 
unions can require employees in a union bargaining unit to pay that portion of 
union dues which go to activities related to collective bargaining. Right-to-work 
rules have been criticized in that they permit “free riders” because unions continue 
to have a duty to fairly represent employees in a union bargaining unit even if such 
employees are not paying any dues.
192
 But just as importantly here, whether 
employees pay dues to a union or not has no impact on public budgets. 
The Wisconsin statute has additional rules which clearly do not relate to the 
state budget. First, the law bars dues checkoff for employees who want to pay dues 
to the union, even if the employer would agree to it.
193
 Second, the law’s onerous 
and unprecedented provisions for yearly recertification, applicable to the majority 
of the bargaining unit, have no purpose other than to make it very difficult for a 
union to stay certified. In Wisconsin previously and in labor law generally, once a 
union has been certified, its status can be challenged if 30% of the members of the 
bargaining unit request an election to do so, and the union can be decertified in the 
election if a majority of those voting choose that option. This long-established rule 
in both the public and private sectors correctly balances the need for stability in 
labor relations with the concept that a union should not represent employees if a 
majority of the employees does not wish it. 
The real impetus behind this law is that some Republicans wish to damage 
unions institutionally because unions support Democrats more frequently than 
Republicans. For example, in a fundraising letter, Wisconsin State Senate majority 
leader Scott Fitzgerald explained that the goal of the Wisconsin legislation was “to 
break the power of unions . . . once and for all.”194 Further, in a Fox News 
interview, Fitzgerald said, “If we win this battle, and the money is not there under 
the auspices of the unions, certainly what you’re going to find is President Obama 
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 192. See, e.g., Michael M. Oswalt, Note, The Grand Bargain: Revitalizing Labor 
Through NLRA Reform and Radical Workplace Relations, 57 DUKE L.J. 691, 701 (2007). 
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is going to have a much more difficult time getting elected and winning the state of 
Wisconsin.”195 
These laws are often not even supported by actual public employers. For 
example, while the Wisconsin bill was pending, the executive director of the 
Wisconsin Association of School Boards wrote to the Wisconsin legislature: 
Many [Wisconsin Association of School Board] members are gravely 
concerned that the changes in the . . . bill limiting the scope of 
collective bargaining would wipe away the ability of local school 
boards to use the bargaining process in ways that enhance local control 
by telling local school boards they are prohibited from deciding 
whether to enter into a contract on any item other than wages; and 
would immeasurably harm the collaborative relationships that exist 
between school boards and teachers and may lead to job actions and 
other disruptions of educational services that will harm the educational 
quality in our public schools.
196
 
Further, taking away collective bargaining rights is actively harmful. As a recent 
study by labor relations experts explained: 
Challenges to the freedom of association and the right to bargain 
collectively places the United States out of sync with established 
international human-rights principles. Collective bargaining has 
historically served to increase consumer purchasing power, assure 
voice in the workplace, and provide checks and balances in society. 
Models for collective bargaining in the public sector have incorporated 




As to the first point, Article 23 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights stresses the importance of collective bargaining rights for all 
workers, including public employees.
198
 So does the 1998 International Labor 
Organization Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (the 
United States is a signatory to this document).
199
 In the latter document, “the 
United States pledged ‘to promote and to realize . . . the principles concerning the 
fundamental rights’ defined in the declaration, the first of which is ‘freedom of 
association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining.’”200 
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have publicly declared that at 
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least some of the legislation described above violates international human rights 
standards.
201
 Human Rights Watch has noted that the “United States also is a party 
to and bound by its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, which guarantees everyone the right to protect his or her interests 
through trade union activity, including collective bargaining . . . .”202 
Further, contrary to stereotypes, unions do not cause inefficiencies; in fact, they 
can improve efficiency. Data showing that unions have a positive effect come from 
sources that range from international surveys to analyses of specific types of 
employers. In 2002, the World Bank released a report based on more than 1000 
studies of the effects of unions and collective bargaining.
203
 This report found that 
in the United States high unionization rates tend to have higher productivity, less 
pay inequality, and lower unemployment.
204
 It found that workers who belong to 
unions are generally better trained than their non-union counterparts and that 
unions also help retain workers.
205
 Also, having a large number of workers 
represented by unions tended to have a stabilizing and beneficial effect on a 
country’s economy.206 At the other end of the spectrum, there are studies of specific 
types of public-sector unions and employers in the United States. For example, 
evidence shows that unionization of teachers correlates positively with higher 
student scores on standardized tests.
207
 
A survey of the literature on unions and efficiency concluded that there “is scant 
evidence that unions act to reduce productivity . . . while there is substantial 
evidence that unions act to improve productivity in many industries.”208 While this 
view is not unanimous, the combined teaching of most studies is that unions can 
increase productivity in many to most circumstances, and can decrease it in 
others.
209
 In either case, the effect is usually not large.
210
 Further, in recent years, 
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new innovations in problem solving in labor management negotiations have 
brought new efficiencies to union workplaces, keeping the efficiencies brought by 
worker voice and a highly skilled workforce while eliminating certain types of 
work rules that may be less appropriate to modern workplaces.
211
 
II. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, BARGAINING, AND FURLOUGHS 
A. Interest Arbitration Cases 
A plurality of states permits public employees to bargain, to bar strikes, and to 
resolve bargaining impasses through interest arbitration. All told, approximately 
thirty states use some form of binding interest arbitration.
212
 In this system, a 
neutral arbitrator (or sometimes a tripartite board) holds a hearing, evaluates 
evidence, follows statutory criteria, and makes a binding decision as to the terms of 
the collective bargaining agreement.
213
 
Public-sector statutes use three basic models of interest arbitration.
214
 The first is 
conventional arbitration. In conventional arbitration, the arbitrator can pick among 
the parties’ proposals, create compromises, or even go beyond the parties’ 
proposals.
215
 The second is final offer whole package arbitration. In final offer 
whole package arbitration, the arbitrator may only choose the final set of proposals 
from the union or the final set of proposals from the employer, as a package.
216
 The 
third is final offer issue-by-issue arbitration. In this system, the arbitrator must 
choose from final proposals from one side or the other, but the arbitrator may 
choose final proposals on some issues from one side and final proposals on other 
issues from the other side.
217
 
Also, statutes providing for binding interest arbitration almost always include 
specific criteria which the arbitrator must consider and evaluate in making the 
arbitration award.
218
 The employer’s ability to pay is a standard factor the arbitrator 
must consider, as are the pay and conditions of similar employees (often called 
“comparables”).219 
Given the former factor, the economic crisis has played a big role in interest 
arbitrations in the age of Obama. Public employers consistently rely on the 
economic crisis to justify their positions. Even cases ruling in favor of a union have 
noted it. For example, an April 2010 interest arbitration award involving Helena, 
Montana concluded: 
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The City was shown to have the ability to pay for the increase. . . .  
 [T]he City made what was essentially an equitable plea and asserted 
that fundamental fairness and one’s “gut” sense should govern here as 
well. While there is some pull to that argument, especially given the 
economic circumstances around the nation and the state of 
Montana, . . . [and] there was some cogency to the claim that at this 
point in history even a small increase should be regarded as something 
of great benefit, the evidence and assertions demonstrated by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the Union’s position was more 
justified than the City’s on this record.220 
Most arbitrators in these times have given more weight to the recession’s effect 
on the employer’s ability to pay than to other factors. An award from Washington 
state declared, “[T]his Arbitrator took the position that in the current tough 
economic times the State’s ability to pay trumps all of the other statutory 
factors . . . .”221 Similarly, another arbitrator in a Minnesota case explained: 
Minnesota’s general economic conditions have deteriorated sharply 
since CY 2007. For this reason, the wage and insurance terms that the 
instant parties might have voluntarily negotiated under the prevailing 
economic and fiscal regime most likely would have been different from 
those that were negotiated by comparable external bargaining units 
during better times—2007. Accordingly, the Arbitrator is not inclined 
to rely on the “dated” negotiated settlements of comparable external 
bargaining units—a conclusion that is strongly attenuated by the 
Employer’s increasingly strained ability-to-pay.222 
In another Minnesota case, a different arbitrator noted that “the vast majority of 
cities in the Employer’s comparison group are proposing 0% [wage increases] for 
2010. . . . Some cities and counties are settling at 0% . . . .”223 
In sum, the economic crisis is hurting public-sector workers in contract 
negotiations. While this may not be shocking, it is worth noting that the most 
common approach to resolving public-sector impasses may exacerbate this 
tendency. Most public workers are not allowed to strike, and the most common 
alternative is interest arbitration. Interest arbitrators are generally required, by 
statute, to consider the employer’s ability to pay. And in hard economic times, that 
factor is often the trump card for employers in the arbitrations. 
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B. Furlough Cases and the Contract Clause 
Beyond interest arbitration awards, many public employers, including those with 
unionized employees, have imposed involuntary furloughs—mandatory days off 
without pay—as well as staffing cuts. Between 2007 and 2009, over half the states 
implemented mandatory furloughs.
224
 In 2010, California and New York ordered 
furloughs for a combined total of approximately 250,000 state employees.
225
 
For unionized public employees, furloughs often at least seem to violate the 
express terms of the collective bargaining agreement that covers them. Unions have 
challenged such actions, notably under the Contract Clause of the Constitution. The 
Contract Clause provides that “No state shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts . . . .”226 Such challenges to furloughs have, however, 
largely been unsuccessful. 
For example, in Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 89 v. Prince George’s 
County, Maryland,
227
 the Fourth Circuit rejected a Contract Clause challenge to 
involuntary furloughs. In that case, in reaction to budget problems, the county 
employer instituted a furlough plan which required approximately 5900 employees 
to forego 80 scheduled work hours in fiscal year 2009.
228
 This amounted to a 3.85% 
annual pay reduction.
229
 The employer relied on a section of the county’s personnel 
law, which authorized the county to furlough employees when the county executive 
determined that a revenue shortfall required the compensation level of a 
department, agency, or office to be reduced.
230
 The district court upheld the union’s 
Contract Clause challenge to this act.
231
 
The Fourth Circuit reversed.
232
 It first described the three-part test used in 
Contract Clause cases, which is intended to balance the Clause’s protections 
against the states’ reserved police powers: “(1) whether there has been an 
impairment of the contract; (2) whether that impairment was substantial; and (3) if 
so, whether the impairment was nonetheless a legitimate exercise of the police 
power.”233 Here, the first prong was not satisfied because the court found other 
sections of the county personnel law made all provisions of collective bargaining 




The Fourth Circuit did note that a different result would have obtained had 
plaintiff unions been able to identify any part of their contracts that specifically 
prohibited furloughs; “If they had made such an identification, the Unions would 
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have been entitled to summary judgment,” as part of the county personnel law 
authorizing a contract provision to override the general authority for furloughs.
235
 
The union, however, relied on somewhat more general language guaranteeing 
wages and hours.
236
 These sections, the court held, were not enough.
237
 
The California Supreme Court recently upheld furloughs of state employees 
under a different theory in a case involving somewhat different facts.
238
 Governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger had ordered furloughs for state workers on the first and 
third Fridays of each month from February 2009 to June 2010.
239
 In a lengthy 
opinion, the court first held that the trial court erred in deciding that Governor 
Schwarzenegger’s declaration of a fiscal emergency in an executive order gave him 
the authority to impose furloughs unilaterally on state workers.
240
 Code sections 
that might have given the governor authority to issue furloughs were superseded by 
the state public-sector labor law governing state employees.
241
 So, when the 
governor issued his furlough order on December 19, 2008, it was not valid at that 
time.
242
 But subsequently, on February 19, 2009, the legislature enacted a revision 
to the 2008 budget, reducing the 2008–09 fiscal appropriation for state employee 
compensation to a level which reflected the reduced compensation to be paid under 
the governor’s furlough plan.243 This, the court held, was a permissible method to 
authorize and mandate such furloughs.
244
 
This topic is not entirely new. Unions have brought Contract Clause cases 
challenging unilateral acts by governments that attempt to modify collective 
bargaining agreements since the 1970s. Some have succeeded (including some 
challenges to furloughs), and some have not.
245
 For example, in 2008 the Eighth 
Circuit upheld a Contract Clause challenge to a city’s unilateral reduction in health 
care premiums for retired employees.
246
 A collective bargaining agreement 
obligated the city of Benton, Arkansas, to pay the full cost of the premiums, but 
during the term of the agreement, the city council attempted to reduce the city’s 
contributions.
247
 The court rejected the city’s claim of “economic necessity,” 
holding that it only applied to “‘unprecedented emergencies,’ such as mass 
foreclosures caused by the Great Depression.”248  
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Time will tell whether other cases will use as strict a standard as the Eighth 
Circuit has—or perhaps courts will conclude that our current era is a time of 
unprecedented emergencies. Contract Clause cases can depend greatly on specific 
facts, specific local laws, and the attitudes of judges in analyzing the three factors 
used in Contract Clause cases. As one court remarked in a Contracts Clause case 
involving a teachers’ union, “public servants might well be called upon to sacrifice 
first when the public interest demands sacrifice.”249 
An even more dramatic strategy involves a municipal employer declaring 
bankruptcy and thus voiding its obligations in collective bargaining agreements. In 
June 2010 a California court rejected a union’s legal challenge to this process.250 
Notably, § 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, enacted to avoid the harsh results of 
bankruptcies on union contracts in the private sector, does not apply to municipal 
bankruptcies.
251
 If the economic situation worsens, more cities may try to use 
bankruptcy to avoid obligations under union contracts. Some leaders, including 
former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, have even suggested that states 
should consider bankruptcy as a mechanism to avoid pension obligations.
252
 This 
would be unchartered waters, and the idea is quite controversial.
253
 
III. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY 
The federal government in the past two years has produced two intriguingly 
contrasting issues on the fundamental question of whether public employees should 
have the right to bargain collectively at all. In the first, employees of the TSA have 
struggled to overturn a ban on collective bargaining that the Bush administration 
imposed. Meanwhile, Congress has seriously considered a bill that would give 
basic collective bargaining rights to all public safety employees of local 
governments, essentially providing minimum rights to such employees who 
currently have none. This would be the first federal law in U.S. history granting 
such rights to broad swaths of state and local employees. 
A. The Continuing Quest for Collective Bargaining Rights at the TSA 
While this issue began during the Bush administration, there have been very 
important recent developments. After the terrorist attacks on 9/11, significant 
sectors of the federal government were reorganized into the Department of 
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 These moves included the creation of the TSA.
255
 
When the TSA was formed, the Bush administration determined that its workers 
would not have bargaining rights. On January 8, 2003, James Loy, then the head of 
the TSA, issued an order stating that TSA employees, “in light of their critical 
national security responsibilities, shall not . . . be entitled to engage in collective 
bargaining or be represented for the purpose of engaging in such bargaining by any 
representative or organization.”256 
Further, when the DHS was created, the Bush administration insisted that the 
agency be allowed to create a personnel system that was not covered by existing 
federal-sector labor law and civil service rules.
257
 The statute creating the DHS 
ultimately did grant the agency the right to create a more “flexible” system that 
could provide employees and their unions fewer rights than under these 
pre-existing laws.
258
 But Democrats made sure that the statute preserved the basic 
right to bargain collectively.
259
 This set the stage for litigation.
260
 The DHS then set 
up a very restrictive system: among other things, the system allowed the DHS to 
void, unilaterally, any provision of any union contract it had agreed to.
261
 The union 
representing DHS workers
262
 sued, claiming this was not “collective bargaining” as 
the statute required. In National Treasury Employees Union v. Chertoff,
263
 the D.C. 
Circuit agreed with the union. Collective bargaining is a “term of art,” and it could 
not mean, inter alia, a system in which one side was not bound by collectively 
bargained and signed contracts.
264
 
This, however, did not resolve the issue of whether employees in the TSA 
should have collective bargaining rights, and the issue remains contentious. The 
rhetoric, especially immediately after 9/11, was not always measured. “Do we 
really want some work rule negotiated prior to 9/11 to prevent us from finding 
somebody who is carrying a bomb on a plane with your momma?” Senator Phil 
Gramm asked in 2002.
265
 In contrast, in debates over labor rules in the DHS 
generally, Senator Barbara Boxer insisted: “[T]he heroes of September 11 were 
union members.”266 “They . . . were afforded the protections of collective 
bargaining . . . . They never looked at their watch and said Oh, gee, I have been on 
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the 74th floor of the World Trade Center, and now I have worked eight hours and I 
am coming down.”267 
Years after 9/11, the debate continues. In 2007 the Senate approved a broad bill 
that would have given collective bargaining rights to TSA workers,
268
 but that 
language was stripped from the bill after President Bush threatened a veto.
269
 In the 
fall of 2010, the House considered but did not pass a bill that would have granted 
bargaining rights to TSA employees.
270
 President Obama’s first nominee to head 
the TSA, Erroll Southers, withdrew his name from consideration at least in 
significant part due to Republican opposition to collective bargaining rights for 
TSA employees.
271
 John Pistole, the man who finally filled the position of head of 
the TSA, initially refused to state whether or not he would permit TSA employees 
to bargain collectively.
272
 He announced that DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano had 
asked him to review the collective bargaining issue and make a recommendation.
273
 
While this issue was pending, the American Federation of Government 
Employees (AFGE) and the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) were 
jockeying to try to represent TSA employees. Both unions filed petitions with the 
Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), the federal sector analogue to the 
National Labor Relations Board.
274
 The FLRA’s regional director rejected both 
petitions on the grounds that the FLRA did not have jurisdiction because TSA 
employees lack bargaining rights.
275
  
However, in late 2010 the full FLRA reversed and held that a union election 
could go forward.
276
 It explained that even though a union, if elected, could not 
bargain collectively, it could still represent employees in some contexts, for 
example, in grievances or as a Weingarten representative
277
 (assisting employees 
during investigations with possible disciplinary consequences).
278
 The FLRA also 
rejected arguments that unionization would threaten national security.
279
 This is 
significant first because it is unusual for a public-sector labor agency to supervise 
an election and potentially to certify a union that has no right to bargain 
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collectively. It is also important because of the sheer size of the unit: more than 
40,000 employees.
280
 In June 2011 the AFGE won a runoff election and is now the 
certified representative of TSA employees.
281
 
Meanwhile, back in February 2011, Director Pistole issued his Decision 
Memorandum on the issue.
282
 He has decided to create, in his words, “a 
comprehensive structure that is different and distinct, separate and independent, 
from [the statute that covers most federal employees], but that will provide for 
genuine, binding collective bargaining on specified subjects at the national level 
with the union, if any, that prevails in an election process . . . .”283 The system 
would feature a scope of bargaining even more limited than the limited bargaining 
permitted of most federal workers. The union could negotiate about rules on 
priorities for vacation time and shift assignments, issues regarding workplace 
transfers, parking subsidies, uniform allowances, the selection process for special 
assignments, going from full time to part time and vice-versa, and how employees 
are recognized for commendable work.
284
 Unions will not be allowed to negotiate 
over compensation (which is also not permitted under the general federal statute), 
job qualification rules, disciplinary standards, or security procedures—including 
when and where workers are deployed, and the means and methods of covert 
testing and results.
285
 Disputes and impasses under this system will be resolved “by 
panels selected from a roster of neutrals, with backgrounds in both security and 
collective bargaining, who are mutually agreed upon” by the TSA and the union.286 
This may not be the last word on the issue: unions may find this inadequate, and 
opponents of collective bargaining may feel it goes too far. Broadly, this issue 
raises the fundamental question of whether collective bargaining is proper in the 
public sector, or at least in large parts of the public sector. Arguments used to 
oppose collective bargaining at the TSA—that it creates inefficiencies and delays—
could be used to oppose bargaining in practically any part of the public sector. 
Unions in the age of Obama will have to counter such arguments, as questions 
about the fundamental legitimacy of unions in government employment are not 
going away. 
B. The First Federal Law Guaranteeing Bargaining Rights for (Some) Employees 
of State and Local Governments? 
In contrast, the proposed Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act of 
2009, House Bill 413, would provide collective bargaining rights for public safety 
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officers employed by state or local governments.
287
 If enacted, it would provide 
such rights for the first time to a large number of employees—mostly police and 
firefighters—as a significant minority of states (approximately seventeen) do not 
permit both police and firefighters to bargain collectively.
288
 
This Act would direct the FLRA to determine whether state laws provide 
specified collective bargaining rights for public safety officers.
289
 If a state’s law 
did not meet the standards in the Act, the FLRA would prescribe regulations 
covering the employees. 
Specifically, the Act would: 
(1) grant such employees the right to form and join a labor organization 
which excludes management and supervisory employees; 
(2) require public safety employers to recognize and agree to bargain 
with the employees’ chosen labor organization; 
(3) require the FLRA to issue regulations establishing rights and 
responsibilities for public safety employers and employees in states that 
do not substantially provide for such public safety employee rights and 
responsibilities.  
(4) direct the Authority, in such cases, to:   
 (a) determine the appropriateness of units for union representation;  
 (b) supervise or conduct elections to determine whether a union has 
been selected as an exclusive representative by a voting majority of the 
employees in an appropriate unit;  
 (c) resolve issues relating to the duty to bargain in good faith;  
 (d) conduct hearings and resolve complaints of unfair labor 
practices; and   
 (e) resolve exceptions to arbitrators’ awards.  
(5) grant a public safety employer, employee, or labor organization the 
right to seek enforcement of Authority regulations and orders in state 
court; 
(6) prohibit public safety employers, employees, and labor 
organizations from engaging in lockouts or strikes; and 
(7) provide that existing collective bargaining units and agreements 
would not be invalidated by this Act.
290
 
This bill did not pass while Democrats controlled both houses of Congress,
291
 
and with political power shifting in those chambers, it is much less likely now than 
when I first presented this Article that this bill will become law in the near future. 
Still, proponents of the bill have not given up, and conservatives and Republicans 
are sometimes more sympathetic to police and firefighter unions than to other 
public-sector unions. 
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In some ways, this bill would be a substantial departure from traditional 
public-sector labor law. The federal government has never attempted to grant 
collective bargaining rights to large groups of state and local government 
employees. The only other time the federal government has granted bargaining 
rights to any state or local government employees involved the Urban Mass Transit 
Act of 1964.
292
 This law provides funds for local governments to take over 
previously private mass transit systems and requires that collective bargaining 
rights of their employees be preserved.
293
 The Public Safety Employee Act would 
affect many more employees. 
In other ways, this law would not be a significant departure. Most federal 
employment laws cover public employees as well as private-sector employees. In 
some cases there are a few special rules, and in some cases the coverage is mostly 
identical. For example, the FLSA covers state and local government employees, 
although it contains some overtime rules that apply only to the public sector.
294
 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 generally applies to the public sector in 
the same ways, substantively and procedurally, as it does to the private sector.
295
 Is 
it more intrusive for the federal government to apply anti-discrimination laws
296
 
and wage-and-hour rules to state and local governments than to mandate minimal 
collective bargaining rights? 
Were this bill to become law, one would expect constitutional challenges. As 
late as 1976, the Supreme Court held that applying the FLSA to state and local 
government employers violated the Tenth Amendment.
297
 That case was overruled 
in 1985.
298
 But if this Act were passed, it could give the Court a chance to revisit 
this issue. Notably, the Court is arguably more conservative and sensitive to issues 
of state sovereignty in public employment now, as witnessed by its more recent 
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. For example, in Alden v. Maine, the Court, 
relying at least in part on the Eleventh Amendment, held that states were immune 




Most broadly, passing this Act could be seen as a bold assertion of the 
importance of collective bargaining rights. In contrast to the TSA controversy, it 
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would be an assertion of the importance of such rights in the context of employees 
responsible for public safety. Still, one might wonder: why should a federal law 
provide bargaining rights only to public safety employees? It is hard to find a 
policy or practical principle that suggests that police and firefighters should have 
collective bargaining rights, while, for example, janitors, clerks, or teachers in 
government service should not. 
IV. WHAT DOES “COLLECTIVE BARGAINING” MEAN? CURIOUS CASES INVOLVING 
THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTION 
Recent cases in Missouri have raised interesting and important questions not 
only for public workers in that state, but also over the very meaning of the term 
“collective bargaining.” 
In 1945, Missouri added the following clause to its state Constitution: 
“employees shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing.”300 In 1947, in City of Springfield v. Clouse, 
the Missouri Supreme Court held that this provision did not apply to public 
employees.
301
 Sixty years later, in 2007, the Missouri Supreme Court overruled 
Clouse and held this constitutional provision did cover public employees.
302
 This 
was significant because many government employees in Missouri, notably public 
school teachers and police, did not (and still do not) have a statutory right to 
bargain collectively
303
 (other public employees in Missouri are covered by a limited 
state public-sector law passed in the 1960s).
304
 
Missouri has not yet passed a statute implementing this constitutional guarantee 
or explaining how “collective bargaining” under the state constitution should work. 
Every other jurisdiction that provides public employees the right to bargain 
collectively has a detailed statute spelling out the rights and obligations of the 
parties in the collective bargaining process.
305
  
Thus, after Independence in 2007, it is unclear what specific rights Missouri 
public employees have under their state constitution. Not surprisingly, views vary 
sharply. Public school employers in Missouri have promulgated labor relations 
rules quite different from what has traditionally been considered “collective 
bargaining.” In 2009, lower state courts in Missouri decided two cases involving 
such systems.
306
 (In the interest of full disclosure, I note that in these two cases I 
acted as a witness on behalf of the unions challenging these systems.) 
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In the first case, the Springfield, Missouri school district insisted that employees 
be given the option to choose multiple unions to represent the same employees at 
the same time.
307
 This is contrary to the principle of exclusive representation, a 
staple of all U.S. labor laws. In the second case, the Bayless, Missouri school 
district insisted that a bargaining representative could be selected in only one way: 
each school within the district (elementary, middle, and high school) would elect 
two individual “representatives,” and these representatives (along with a couple of 
other individuals) would form a body to bargain with the employer.
308
 This is 
contrary to the principle in U.S. labor laws that employees are represented by an 
organization designed to speak with one coherent voice and one that has the power 
and responsibility to enforce a contract. It also violates the principle in U.S. labor 
law that the employer cannot dictate to employees the structure of their 
organization or how leaders of that organization are chosen. 
 In both cases, I testified on behalf of a teachers’ union that in the United States, 
“collective bargaining” is and has been, historically, a term of art with some 
specific meanings and requirements, which include exclusive representation, the 
right to negotiate contracts that are binding on both parties, and the ability of 
workers to choose freely their collective representative without interference from 
employers. I discussed the use of this term and the practice under the early history 
of the Railway Labor Act, the National Industrial Recovery Act, the War Labor 
Boards (for both World Wars), and the early years of the National Labor Relations 
Act. The Springfield case was decided in the employer’s favor, but the Bayless case 
found a violation of the Missouri Constitution.  
More specifically, in Springfield National Education Association v. Springfield 
School Board, the school board promulgated a system for union recognition that 
included the following provision: employees in a bargaining unit of teachers could, 
in an initial ballot, choose to be represented by one union, multiple unions, or no 
union.
309
 Under the multiple union option, more than one union would 
simultaneously represent the same group of teachers.
310
 Nothing required that the 
labor organizations agree to this or have consistent goals.
311
 Thus, the same 
employees could be represented, simultaneously, by two (or more) hostile and 
competing unions. This, as noted above, contradicts the principle in U.S. labor law 
of exclusive representation: only one union represents one group of employees. 
The Springfield judge relied on modern dictionary definitions of “collective 
bargaining.” Specifically, the judge quoted the Independence decision, which had 
referenced “collective bargaining” briefly in a footnote: 
“The dictionary definition says ‘collective bargaining’ is ‘negotiation 
for the settlement of the terms of a collective agreement between an 
employer or group of employers on one side and a union or number of 
unions on the other.[’]” The [Missouri] Supreme Court thereafter 
quoted BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th Ed. 2004), which says: 
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 310. See id.  
 311. See id. at *2–9. 
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“‘collective bargaining’ means ‘negotiations between an employer and 
the representatives of organized employees to determine the conditions 
of employment . . . .[’]” 
 None of the definitions referenced by the [Missouri] Supreme Court 




As a matter of constitutional interpretation, one wonders about using modern 
dictionaries to define terms put into a constitution more than sixty years ago. As a 
practical matter, the possibility of multiple union representation would seem 
unworkable, at least in situations (as in the Springfield case) where the two 
competing unions were hostile to each other but had the traditional duties standard 
in U.S. labor law (contract negotiation, grievance handling, duty of fair 
representation, etc.). 
The effect of this decision for these parties was largely mooted by subsequent 
events on the ground. After the decision, the teachers voted to use the “one union 
representative” model—and voted in the union on whose behalf I testified.313 But 
the model proposed in Springfield arose in another Missouri school district.
314
 
A few months after Springfield, the union in Bayless successfully challenged a 
different system the Bayless school board had created.
315
 In Bayless, the employer 
required employees in each school in the district to select two individual 
representatives and two alternates; these representatives, plus one representative 
designated by the union with the largest employee membership, would then be 
allowed, as a group, to bargain with the employer.
316
 
Bayless held this did not satisfy the constitutional right to bargain collectively.
317
 
The judge in Bayless distinguished Springfield, explaining that in the Springfield 
process, employees were at least permitted to choose a traditional exclusive 
representative.
318
 In contrast, the process in Bayless “mandates collaborative 
bargaining, not collective bargaining through a union representative.”319 It is not 
clear where the judge got the term “collaborative bargaining”; it does not appear in 
the Missouri Constitution, Missouri’s public-sector labor statute, or relevant case 
law. It would have been better, in my view, for Bayless to have held that, among 
other things, this system would not have allowed the employees a “representative 
of their own choosing” (per the Constitutional language). In any case, after the 
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Bayless decision, the union on whose behalf I testified won a representation 
election to represent these employees. 
More broadly, this litigation, like the litigation described above involving the 
DHS, raises the question of whether “collective bargaining” is a term of art with 
some specific meaning, at least in the public sector. As noted above, the D.C. 
Circuit in Chertoff held that it is.
320
 In that case, the court was dealing with the 
statute authorizing the DHS, not the Missouri Constitution, and of course the D.C. 
Circuit is not the Missouri Supreme Court. But in some important senses that case 
and the Missouri cases are similar. In both instances, employees were granted a 
right to bargain collectively; in neither instance did the authority granting that right 
define “bargain collectively”; and in both cases, courts had to try to give meaning 
to that term.  
This is an especially interesting issue in the public sector, since “collective 
bargaining” has a universal meaning on some, but not all, issues. As noted above, 
state public-sector labor laws vary significantly on how bargaining impasses are 
resolved and what topics unions may legally bargain about.
321
 On the other hand, 
public-sector labor laws have many fundamental rules in common with each other 
(notably, using an exclusive majority representative chosen by the employees). 
Indeed, the term “collective bargaining” in all U.S. labor laws throughout history 
always meant some specific things, including exclusive, majority representation.  
It is not yet clear how these issues in Missouri will be resolved. As of this 
writing, the state legislature still has not clarified what precise rights public workers 
have under the state constitution. Even if the state enacted a bargaining statute, 
given that the right to collectively bargain is constitutionally protected, it is 
possible that a court could find a statute providing certain rules did not, in fact, 
provide “collective bargaining.” Most fundamentally, in the age of Obama, 
seventy-five years after the passage of the NLRA and fifty years after the passage 
of the first state law authorizing collective bargaining in the public sector, we see a 
jurisdiction struggling with the meaning of the term “collective bargaining.” 
CONCLUSION 
The current period presents stark contrasts for public-sector unions. Union 
density rates are high, yet the economic crisis has created a variety of threats: 
budget cuts, to be sure, but also political threats in which public employees are 
painted as an unfairly privileged class and long-standing rights to bargain 
collectively are at risk. “The best of times, the worst of times” will not do, given 
the growing tide of bad news for public-sector unions. But another old saying 
comes to mind: “may you live in interesting times.” The phrase is often cited as an 
old Chinese curse. While it may not be Chinese in origin,
322
 the sense in which it is 
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a curse remains. For public sector labor, at least the first years of the age of Obama 
have been unusually interesting times. 
In my view, public-sector labor law as it has existed for decades has worked 
well. State deficits are not caused by public-sector bargaining rights. As shown 
above, multiple studies have demonstrated that, after adjusting for type of worker 
and type of job, most public-sector workers are paid less than their private-sector 
equivalents. While some public-sector pension funds have real funding problems, 
these are not generally the fault of collective bargaining. This is true in large part 
because in the vast majority of states, public-sector unions are not legally permitted 
to negotiate over pension benefits. It is also true because other factors—notably the 
stock market crash of 2008 and questionable actuarial assumptions—are the main 
causes of the funding problems.  
Thus, the radical and reactionary amendments to public-sector statutes some 
states have adopted are unlikely to help government budgets. They will, however, 
hurt working people and public services, and are also likely to dissuade talented 
people from entering public service. These effects will, in turn, harm the public. 
The attacks on collective bargaining are best understood as partisan politics—an 
attempt to de-fund and cripple unions because they are a core constituency of the 
Democratic Party. That is no justification for removing a longstanding, important 
right for working men and women. 
